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Abstract: It  has  been  argued  that  an  epistemically  rational  agent’s evidence  is  subjectively 
mediated  through  some  rational  epistemic  standards,  and  that there  are  incompatible  but 
equally rational  epistemic standards  available  to  agents.  This  supports  Permissiveness,  the 
view according to which one or  multiple fully rational agents are permitted to take distinct 
incompatible doxastic attitudes towards P (relative to a body of evidence). In this paper, I 
argue  that  the  above  claims  entail  the  existence  of  a  unique  and more  reliable  epistemic 
standard. My strategy relies on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. This gives rise to an important 
problem for those who argue that  epistemic standards are  permissive,  since the reliability 
criterion is incompatible with such a type of Permissiveness.
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Permissiveness (or Permissivism) is the view according to which, relative to a body 
of evidence, one or multiple rational agents are permitted to take distinct incompatible doxastic 
attitudes  towards  P.  For  example,  an  agent  could  be  rationally  permitted  to  believe  P  and 
rationally  permitted to  believe  ~P (relative to the same evidence).1 Permissiveness has many 
implications  for  contemporary  theories  of  epistemic  rationality.  For  example,  rejecting 
Permissiveness would confirm evidentialism, the view that an agent’s justification supervenes on 
his  or  her  evidence,  and  would  disprove  various  theories  such  as  epistemic  conservatism 
(roughly, the view that in some situations an agent’s belief that P at time t0 can constitute a 
reason for him or her to believe P at time t1) or epistemic coherentism (roughly, the view that  
beliefs  are  epistemically  justified  insofar  as  they  cohere  with  each  other)  (Podgorski  2016; 
Schoenfield 2014).
In this paper, I challenge the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis, a specific type 
of Permissiveness. According to such a view, the weight of the evidence in favour of P is not 
objectively determined—rather, the evidence is subjectively mediated through an agent’s rational 
epistemic standards. Furthermore, there are multiple incompatible rational epistemic standards, in 
1 See  Kopec  and  Titelbaum  (2016),  White  (2005;  2014) and  Kelly  (2014) for  an  overview  of  the  debate 
surrounding Permissiveness.
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the sense that there are incompatible but equally rational ways to reason from a given body of 
evidence. 
In section 1, I discuss the relationship between the Permissive Epistemic Standards 
Thesis and the reliability criterion, which roughly states that an ideally rational agent’s epistemic 
standards optimize his or her ratio of true to false beliefs. I then present Titelbaum and Kopec’s 
Reasoning Room, which seems to support the claim that the Permissive Epistemic Standards 
Thesis  is  compatible  with  the  reliability  criterion.  If  cases  like  the  Reasoning  Room  are 
conclusive, they provide support for the claim that there can be equally reliable but incompatible 
epistemic standards. In sections 2 and 3, I argue that Titelbaum and Kopec’s Reasoning Room 
gives  rise  to  an  important  objection  against  the  Permissive  Epistemic  Standards  Thesis.  My 
strategy relies on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. Relying on this theorem, I will argue that, no matter 
how many incompatible epistemic standards are equally reliable, one epistemic standard is more 
reliable than all such standards. More generally, this means that the reliability criterion tends to 
support the denial of the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis, since ideally rational epistemic 
peers should endorse the same maximally reliable epistemic standards.
To be clear:  this  paper  remains neutral  on whether  Permissiveness is  true.  I  will 
merely argue that  a  specific  type of  Permissiveness (i.e.  the  Permissive Epistemic Standards 
Thesis)  faces  an  important  difficulty:  the  reliability  criterion  seems  incompatible  with 
Permissiveness concerning epistemic standards.2 
1. Epistemic Rationality, Permissive Standards and the Reliability Criterion
According  to  Permissiveness,  one  or  multiple  fully  rational  epistemic  peers  are 
sometimes permitted to take distinct incompatible doxastic attitudes towards P (relative to the 
same  body  of  evidence).  So  stated,  Permissiveness  is  ambiguous:  the  concepts  of  peerage, 
2 Note that Permissiveness could be true while the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis is false. Specifically, 
relative to the unique set of rational epistemic standards, one could sometimes be permitted to believe P and to 
disbelieve  P.  For  example,  Kopec  (2015) and  Raleigh  (2015) have  discussed  cases  where  an  agent  has 
conclusive  evidence  that  believing  P  will  guarantee  P's  truth.  These  cases  seem to  support  Permissiveness 
regardless of whether the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis is true. Indeed, suppose that (i) one’s belief that 
P will entail that P, (ii) one’s belief that ~P will entail that ~P and (iii) one knows such facts. In such a situation, 
even if there is a uniquely rational set of epistemic standards, it seems that one is rationally permitted to believe 
P and also rationally permitted to disbelieve P.
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evidence and rationality are unclear (Kopec and Titelbaum 2016). Before I present my argument, 
I’ll quickly clarify how I understand these notions. First, I will take an agent’s evidence to consist 
in  the  facts  available  to  him  or  her  that  have  a  bearing  on  whether  P.  Accordingly,  direct 
perception, memory, arguments and the like can be part of an agent’s evidence. Second, I will 
take epistemic peers to be agents who share all the relevant evidence and who have the same 
abilities for evaluating the evidence. Third, I am concerned with ideally rational agents—that is, 
agents  with  great  cognitive  capacities  who  satisfy  the  optimal  rational  epistemic  standards 
available to them. By way of contrast, many theories of epistemic rationality suggest that agents 
are permitted to satisfy suboptimal but sufficiently good epistemic standards, such as fast and 
frugal heuristics (Todd and Gigerenzer 2000). I am not concerned with such theories.
Now, here is a quick argument against Permissiveness. It seems natural to think that 
one should believe P if one has sufficient evidence for the belief that P, and that one should 
refrain from believing P if one lacks sufficient evidence for the belief that P. In such a context, 
since the evidence for believing P is either sufficient or insufficient, isn’t it trivial to think that 
there  cannot  be  permissive  situations?  Specifically,  since  the  evidence  is  either  sufficient  or 
insufficient, it seems that there is always a unique doxastic attitude to hold towards P.
As  many philosophers  have  noted,  the  problem with  this  quick  argument  is  that 
assuming that the sufficiency of the evidence is objectively determined begs the question. What 
does it mean to have sufficient evidence for the belief that P? According to many philosophers, 
the evidence is sufficient or insufficient insofar as it has been mediated through a set of epistemic 
standards. An agent’s epistemic standards are the rules, models or assumptions he or she relies 
on to evaluate the evidence. They act as functions mapping an agent’s evidence onto doxastic 
attitudes  towards  P.  The  notion  of  epistemic  standard  can  be  understood  in  a  broad  sense, 
including background beliefs, standards of reasoning, prior probability distributions and the like. 
Titelbaum  and  Kopec  (forthcoming;  m.s.),  Goldman  (2010),  Meacham  (2014), 
Schoenfield  (2014) and  Sharadin  (2015) have  argued  that  epistemically  rational  agents  can 
entertain incompatible epistemic standards. For example, in the process of evaluating whether 
they should believe a proposition, agents assign different weights to various pieces of evidence. 
So, two agents may reach incompatible conclusions because they are weighting the evidence 
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differently. In such a context, there could be no unique notion of “sufficient evidence” or unique 
way to reason from a body of evidence. Hence, presupposing that the notion of sufficiency is 
identical for all rational agents obliterates a plausible type of Permissiveness.
Let’s  call  the above line of reasoning in favour of Permissiveness the Permissive 
Epistemic Standards Thesis, as in the following:
Permissive  Epistemic  Standards Thesis.  The weight  of  the evidence  in  favour  of  P is  not 
objectively  determined—rather,  the  evidence  is  subjectively  mediated  through  an  agent’s 
rational epistemic standards. Furthermore, there are multiple incompatible rational epistemic 
standards, in the sense that there are incompatible but equally rational ways to reason from a 
body of evidence.
Many authors  doubt  that  the Permissive Epistemic Standard Thesis  is  compatible 
with the reliability criterion. Before I present such an objection, I will give a rough account of the 
relationship between reliability  and epistemic rationality.  Plausibly,  a necessary condition for 
epistemic rationality is reliability—that is, if one is epistemically rational, one is reliable.3 An 
agent is reliable if and only if that agent’s ratio of true to false beliefs is sufficiently good. Of 
course, in an internalist framework, it could be argued that reliability and epistemic rationality are 
separate  issues.  Indeed,  consider  the  case in  which  an agent  competently  weights  his  or  her 
apparent evidence and reasons correctly.  However,  we could suppose that such an agent is a 
deceived brain in a vat. So, while the agent thinks that he or she is responding to the evidence, he 
or she is merely responding to apparent non-factive evidence. In an internalist framework, such 
an agent is epistemically rational but unreliable. Granted, but such an agent is  counterfactually 
reliable. That is, if the agent were in the right conditions, his or her ratio of true to false beliefs 
would be sufficiently good. So, even in an internalist framework, there is a modest sense in which 
epistemic rationality has something to do with reliability: in the right conditions, if an agent is 
epistemically rational, then his or her ratio of true to false beliefs is sufficiently good. 
Now, what does “sufficiently good” mean? Is reaching the right answer 60% of the 
time sufficiently good? I will not defend a specific reliability threshold here. Nevertheless, it is 
patently clear  that reaching the right answer 50% of the time is  not  sufficiently  good. Also, 
suppose that an agent satisfies some sufficiently good epistemic standards (say, standards that 
3 Following others, I here assume that reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic rationality, not a sufficient  
one. See, for instance, Dogramaci and Horowitz (2016, 135).
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lead him or her to reach the correct answer 80% of the time). However, suppose some better 
epistemic standards are available to the agent (say, standards that would lead him or her to reach 
the  right  answer 90%  of  the  time).  Since the  agent  is  satisfying  the  suboptimal  epistemic 
standards, is he or she violating the reliability criterion? As I previously indicated, this paper is 
concerned with ideally rational agents who satisfy the  optimal rational standards  available to 
them. Accordingly, ideally rational agents should satisfy the maximally reliable rational standards 
available to them. So, if some more reliable standards are available to an agent, he or she should 
take these standards.
In view of the foregoing, the following criterion should be correct:
Reliability Criterion. In the right conditions, if A is ideally rational, A satisfies some available 
epistemic standards that optimize his or her ratio of true to false beliefs (and such standards 
lead A to reach the right answer more than 50% of the time).
Those  who  deny  the  Permissive  Epistemic  Standards  Thesis  can  then  offer  the  following 
objection: if there were incompatible but rational epistemic standards, they would not satisfy the 
Reliability Criterion. If I am permitted to believe P and you are permitted to disbelieve P relative 
to the same evidence,  it  seems that I don’t  have more than a 0.5 chance of getting the right 
answer, and you don’t have more than a 0.5 chance of getting the right answer. If an agent who 
satisfies an epistemic standard has a 0.5 chance of getting the right answer, such an epistemic 
standard is unreliable. Hence, it could be argued that the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis 
is incompatible with the Reliability Criterion.
Titelbaum  and  Kopec  (forthcoming;  m.s.) have  argued  that  the  above  line  of 
reasoning is inconclusive. Indeed, imagine a group of epistemic peers who reason independently 
of each other from distinct incompatible epistemic standards. According to Titelbaum and Kopec, 
such agents can be equally reliable, in the sense that they can have an equal probability of being 
correct. The Reasoning Room case illustrates such as possibility:
Reasoning Room. “You are standing in a room with nine other people. Over time the group will 
be given a sequence of hypotheses to evaluate. Each person in the room currently possesses 
the same total evidence relevant to those hypotheses. But each person has a different method 
of  reasoning about  that  evidence.  When you are given a  hypothesis,  you will  apply your 
methods to reason about it in light of your evidence, and your reasoning will suggest either 
that the evidence supports belief in the hypothesis, or that the evidence supports belief in its 
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negation.... For each hypothesis, 9 people reach the same conclusion about which belief the 
evidence supports, while the remaining person concludes the opposite4 .... [E]ach person in the 
room takes  the  evidence  to  support  a  belief  that  turns  out  to  be  true  90% of  the  time” 
(Titelbaum and Kopec forthcoming, 14).5
As we can see in the above case, the members of the group are equally reliable. Each 
of them reaches the right answer 90% of the time. Yet, with respect to each hypothesis presented 
to the participants, there is no consensus among them on which answer is right. So, this means 
that agents with different incompatible epistemic standards can be equally reliable. Therefore, in 
accordance with the Reasoning Room case, the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis seems 
compatible with the Reliability Criterion.
2. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and the Reasoning Room
In the remainder of this paper, I will argue that attempts to reconcile the Permissive 
Epistemic Standards Thesis and the Reliability Criterion (as in Titelbaum and Kopec’s Reasoning 
Room) are subject to an important objection. Specifically, I will argue that, no matter how many 
distinct reliable epistemic standards there are, at least one epistemic standard is more reliable than 
such standards. This result is a direct consequence of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem.
2.1. A very brief introduction to Condorcet’s Jury Theorem
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem roughly states that when equally reliable voters make a 
choice between two outcomes (such as “guilty” and “not guilty”), the majority rule can lead them 
4 This  aspect  of  Titelbaum  and  Kopec’s  argument  could  be  clarified.  Given  the  fact  that  agents  reason  
independently from distinct incompatible standards, we should not expect exactly 9 agents to come to the same 
conclusion every single time. I leave this worry aside here. What matters in this paper is that, on average, 90% 
of agents get the right answer.
5 What  about  cases  where  the  hypothesis  considered  is  trivially  true  (for  example,  what  if  the  hypothesis 
considered  is  “there  is  currently  more  than  one  person in  the  Reasoning  Room”)?  In such  cases,  it  seems 
everyone in the Reasoning Room should reach the same conclusion. Plausibly, what Titelbaum and Kopec have 
in mind is that the hypotheses considered in the Reasoning Room are not trivially true. Besides, their argument is  
conclusive insofar as it applies to some hypotheses, not all hypotheses. One could also wonder why agents in the 
Reasoning Room never withhold judgment concerning P. Indeed, in some situations, a rational agent’s epistemic 
standards  can  recommend  neither  believing  nor  disbelieving  P.  According  to  Titelbaum  and  Kopec,  such 
situations do not happen in the Reasoning Room, since one’s reasoning “will suggest either that the evidence 
supports belief in the hypothesis, or that the evidence supports belief in its negation” (Titelbaum and Kopec 
forthcoming, 14). In order to accommodate the possibility of rational suspension of judgment, we can assume 
that agents who withhold judgment concerning a given hypothesis momentarily leave the Reasoning Room when 
such an hypothesis is evaluated.
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to make collective decisions “with a competence that approaches 1 (infallibility) as either the size 
of the group or the individual competence goes up”  (Estlund 1994, 131). This result is correct 
under a few assumptions. First, the probability that voter i gets the right answer (Pr-i) satisfies the 
following: 0.5<Pr-i<1 and Pr-1=Pr-2...=Pr-n. Second, the  probability that a voter gets the right 
answer is independent of the probability of any other voter getting the right answer (Condorcet 
1785).
The Theorem has interesting implications concerning group competence. Here is an 
example. Suppose that three voters are trying to determine if Jones is guilty (and suppose that 
Jones  is  guilty).  Each  voter  gets  the  right  answer  2/3  of  the  time.  However,  following 
Condorcet’s Theorem, the probability that the group will reach the conclusion that Jones is guilty 
under the majority rule is 20/27 (Estlund 1994, 136). Since 20/27>18/27, this means that the 
group competence using majority rule outperforms the individual competence.
Condorcet’s  Jury  Theorem  has  received  a  great  deal  of  attention  in  political 
philosophy, where it is argued that such a theorem confirms the “wisdom of crowds”, or the 
ability of voting groups to identify the correct decision through simple procedures such as voting 
(Landemore 2012; List and Goodin 2001; Surowiecki 2005; Vermeule 2012, 344–45). It also has 
found applications  in artificial  intelligence for justifying ensemble methods,  which consist  in 
combining multiple learning algorithms. Indeed, distinct but equally good learning algorithms 
can give rise to a better algorithm under an ensemble method (Polikar 2012; Rokach 2010).
However, a common objection against the Theorem is that it is hardly applicable to 
real-life situations.  First,  the independence condition is rarely satisfied.  For example,  opinion 
leaders  frequently  influence  others  in  voting  like  them,  which  violates  the  independence 
condition. Second, the equal reliability condition is unrealistic. For instance, some agents are 
dogmatic,  are not very good at  making clever inferences or fail  to respond correctly to their 
evidence,  while  others  competently  weight  their  epistemic  reasons,  reason  correctly  or  draw 
clever  conclusions.  Such  factors  influence  one’s  reliability.  In  such  a  context,  it  seems 
implausible that a jury will happen to be composed of equally reliable agents (some agents will 
be unreliable and others will be too reliable!). Third, the Jury Theorem is applicable only insofar 
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as agents are confronted with a binary choice (such as “believe P” and “disbelieve P”). However, 
in many situations, we often have more than two options (such as “Bush,” “Gore” or “Nader”).
In view of the above complications, several authors have tried to relax the Theorem’s 
conditions, so that it can be applicable to real-life problems (Bachrach et al. 2012; Dietrich and 
Spiekermann 2013;  Fey 2003;  Kaniovski 2010;  List and Goodin 2001;  Romeijn and Atkinson 
2011; Stone 2015). However, with respect to the project of this paper, it appears that there is no 
need to relax the original Theorem’s conditions. As I will explain shortly, the unrealistic premises 
of the original Theorem seem to be satisfied in cases like the Reasoning Room. So, while these 
relaxed versions of the Theorem are more than relevant, the original theorem will do the trick 
here.
2.2. Reinterpreting the Reasoning Room as a jury case
We can reinterpret Titelbaum and Kopec’s Reasoning Room as a jury case. Indeed, in 
Titelbaum and Kopec’s thought experiment, all of the Jury Theorem’s conditions are satisfied. 
First, all the agents are equally reliable: the probability that reasoner i gets the right answer is 
equal to the probability that reasoner j gets the right answer (for i≠j). Second, the agents in the 
Reasoning Room face a  binary choice (“believe P” or “disbelieve P”).  Third,  the agents  are 
reasoning independently of each other and their standards of reasoning are incompatible, which 
implies that the independence condition is satisfied: with respect to the hypotheses analyzed in 
the reasoning room, the probability that a reasoner gets the right answer is independent of the 
probability of any other reasoner getting the right answer. Hence, the Theorem’s conditions are 
satisfied. In such a context, Condorcet’s Jury Theorem can be applied to Titelbaum and Kopec’s 
thought experiment.
It could be argued that, in the Reasoning Room, the independence condition is merely 
satisfied in part.  Indeed, since agents have the same evidence,  this  could lead them to reach 
similar conclusions about the various hypotheses examined. In such a context, one could argue 
that agents are not independent of each other, since their sharing the same evidence will lead 
them to  form correlated  beliefs.  Minimally,  it  would  be  more  rigorous to  claim that,  in  the 
Reasoning Room, independence is conditional on the evidence. 
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I have two responses to this worry. First, in Titelbaum and Kopec’s Reasoning Room, 
it is false that agents tend to reach similar conclusions about the various hypotheses examined: 
for each hypothesis considered, there is no correlation among the answers. That is, the fact that 
agent i got the right answer does not make it more probable that agent j will get the right answer. 
So, even if agents share the same evidence, this does not entail that the independence condition is 
violated. Second, using a relaxed independence condition that is compatible with the fact that 
voters have the same evidence (such as Dietrich and List’s (2004, 182) Independence Given the 
Evidence condition6 or Dietrich and Spiekermann’s (2013, sect. 4) New Independence condition7) 
would not affect the results of this paper. These relaxed conditions aim at accommodating the 
possibility  of  facing  very  difficult  problems  or  of  having  very  misleading  evidence,  which 
influence whether  agents will  get the right  answer  (see n.  6,  7).  However,  in Titelbaum and 
Kopec’s Reasoning Room, the evidence is not abnormally misleading and agents do not face very 
difficult problems, since 90% of the participants get the right answer each time.8 Given that such 
relaxed independence conditions do not affect the results of this paper, for the sake of simplicity, 
I will assume that the original independence condition is satisfied in the Reasoning Room.
In  accordance  with  such  a  reinterpretation  of  Titelbaum and  Kopec’s  Reasoning 
Room, I will now argue that the following thesis is correct:
Superior Standard Thesis. Let {St-1, St-2, ..., St-n} be a set of incompatible available epistemic 
standards containing n elements. Let Pr-i be the probability that satisfying St-i will lead one to  
form a true belief. Finally, assume that such standards are equally reliable (such that Pr-1=Pr-
2=...Pr-n and 0.5<Pr-i<1). In such a context, there exists an available epistemic standard that is 
more reliable than St-1, St-2, ..., and St-n.
6 Independence  Given  the  Evidence  states:  “The  votes  V1,  V2,  ...,  Vn  are  independent  from  each  other, 
conditional on the body of evidence E” (Dietrich and List 2004, 182). Such a condition affects Condorcet’s Jury 
Theorem in cases where the evidence is misleading. In other words, “the probability that the  majority verdict 
matches the true state of the world (given that state) converges to the probability that the ideal interpretation of 
the evidence is correct, i.e., that the evidence is not misleading” (Dietrich and List 2004, 187).
7 New Independence states: “The events R1, R2, ... that voters 1, 2, ... vote correctly are independent conditional 
on the problem π.” Such a condition affects Condorcet’s Jury Theorem in cases where the problem is very 
difficult, since agents then have less than 0.5 chance of solving the problem correctly.
8 In any case, it is not even clear that defenders of the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis would accept the  
existence of such a thing as “misleading evidence” (as in footnote 6), since they do not think that the evidence  
points in a direction on its own—the evidence points in a direction or another insofar as it has been mediated 
through an agent’s epistemic standards.
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The argument is simple. Suppose that, in the Reasoning Room, Agent 1 satisfies St-1, 
Agent 2 satisfies St-2, and so forth. Then, we can design a “Condorcetian” epistemic standard, as 
in the following way:
(1) If a majority of agents in the Reasoning Room believe P, you should believe P.
(2) If a majority of agents in the Reasoning Room disbelieve P, you should disbelieve P.9
Following the Jury Theorem, such an epistemic standard will necessarily be more reliable than 
St-1, St-2, ..., St-n. Indeed, in accordance with the Theorem, if a majority of agents believe that P, 
the  probability  that  P  is  true  is  higher  than  Pr-i.  Since  Pr-1=Pr-2=...Pr-n,  the  Condorcetian 
standard is more reliable than any of the standards St-1, St-2, ..., St-n. Similarly, if a majority of  
agents believe that ~P, the probability that P is false is higher than Pr-i. Again, since Pr-1=Pr-
2=...Pr-n, the Condorcetian standard would be more reliable than the standards St-1, St-2, ..., St-
n. This means that, in any case, the Condorcetian standard outperforms the standards St-1, St-
2, ..., St-n. Therefore, the Superior Standard Thesis is true as a direct consequence of the Jury 
Theorem.
The idea behind the Superior Standard Thesis is that distinct but reliable standards 
can be reconciled under a unique (and more reliable) “meta-standard.” This line of reasoning is 
largely inspired by recent work in artificial intelligence, where the simple majority rule can be 
used to improve accuracy. Indeed, in order to answer a given question, some distinct but equally 
reliable algorithms (or classifiers) analyze the available data. When the algorithms do not reach 
consensus, an ensemble method based on majority voting can be used to reach a final verdict 
(Rokach 2010, sec. 3.1). For example, in a situation where all of the Jury Theorem’s conditions 
are satisfied, if 10 out of 15 reliable algorithms reached the conclusion that P, the final verdict  
given by the ensemble method would be that P.10 Following Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, such a 
method  outperforms  individual  algorithms,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  more  reliable  than  every 
individual  algorithm.  As  Polikar  (2012,  1–2) notes,  whether  we  are  concerned  with  a 
9 What if the vote is a tie? In such a case, it is equally reliable to believe P and to disbelieve P, and we could  
assume that the agent should withhold judgment or flip a coin. However, coin-flipping might be an epistemically 
irrational belief-forming process (see, for instance, White (2005; 2014)). 
10 As I explained in section 2.1, it is rarely the case that all of the Jury Theorem’s conditions are satisfied. In  
artificial intelligence, some algorithms are more reliable than others. Accordingly, the ensemble method is often 
more complex than a mere application of the majority rule.
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community’s democratic choices or a robot’s learning process, Condorcet’s Jury Theorem can be 
mobilized in favour of the simple majority rule.
2.3. One step further: The “Internal” Reasoning Room
Following the  Superior  Standard  Thesis,  if  the  members  of  the Reasoning Room 
come to know the vote’s result, it would be more reliable for them to go with the majority. But 
what about a case in which such results are unknown? Indeed, in Titelbaum and Kopec’s version 
of  the  Reasoning  Room,  “it’s  unpredictable  who  will  be  the  odd  person  out  for  any  given 
hypothesis.  The  identity  of  the  outlier  jumps  around  the  room”  (Titelbaum  and  Kopec 
forthcoming,  14).  Presumably,  what  they  have  in  mind  is  that  agents  do  not  share  their 
conclusions  with  each other.  In  such a  case,  agents  might  lack  the  capacity  to  evaluate  the 
evidence with the Condorcetian epistemic standard. Since epistemic standards are the kind of 
things agents use to reason and reach new conclusions, it must be possible for agents to evaluate 
the evidence with such epistemic standards.
In response to this worry, recall that epistemic standards act as functions mapping an 
agent’s evidence onto doxastic attitudes towards P. So, in order to evaluate the evidence with the 
Condorcetian epistemic standard, agents in the Reasoning Room do not necessarily need to share 
their conclusions with each other. Agents merely need to  determine if a majority of available 
epistemic standards  {St-1, St-2, ..., St-n} support the conclusion that P. Specifically, they can 
process their  evidence through epistemic standards  {St-1,  St-2,  ...,  St-n},  see which doxastic 
attitude towards P is supported by a majority of epistemic standards and go with the majority.
Relatedly, we can imagine a science-fiction case where evaluating the evidence with 
the Condorcetian epistemic standard is simplified, as in the following:
Internal Reasoning Room. Carole is given a sequence of hypotheses to evaluate. She recently 
received a special brain implant. Here is how her implant works. It processes the available 
evidence  through  an  epistemic  standard  and  notes  whether,  relative  to  such  an  epistemic 
standard,  the evidence supports the conclusion that P or the conclusion that  ~P. Then, the 
implant processes the evidence again, but with a different epistemic standard, and so forth 
(until  the  evidence  has  been  mediated  through  every  known reliable  epistemic  standard). 
Finally,  the  implant  makes  a  recommendation  to  Carole  by  applying  the  Condorcetian 
epistemic  standard  (the  implant  recommends  taking  the  doxastic  attitude  supported  by  a 
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majority of epistemic standards). The implant is transparent, in the sense that Carole can see 
how the evidence has been processed through various epistemic standards.
In the Internal Reasoning Room, Carole’s implant satisfies the Condorcetian epistemic standard. 
So, she has access to a highly reliable epistemic standard. Even if Carole were reliable without 
the implant (assuming that she would otherwise satisfy a reliable standard St-i), she would be 
more reliable in taking the attitudes recommended by her implant.
It could be objected that processing the evidence through epistemic standards {St-1, 
St-2, ..., St-n} is too complicated, or that the Internal Reasoning Room is highly unrealistic (who 
owns such an implant?). Such worries are not relevant here. To be clear: I am not committed to  
the view that the Condorcetian standard is a  realistic way for agents to reason from a body of 
evidence (especially if we are concerned with agents with limited cognitive capacities). My point 
is merely that such a standard is conceivable: we can imagine how a single agent or a group of 
peers could satisfy such a standard. 
The argument of this  paper revolves around the conceivability of a  Condorcetian 
epistemic standard. The fact that real-life agents do not satisfy such a standard does not indicate 
that such a standard does not exist—rather, this indicates that real-life agents fail to satisfy a 
conceivable and highly reliable epistemic standard. 
3. Back to the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis
3.1. A dilemma for defenders of the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis
The  conceivability  of  a  Condorcetian  epistemic  standard  leads  to  a  dilemma  for 
defenders of the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis. The core of the dilemma is this: in the 
right conditions (for instance, when agents are not deceived brains in vats),11 either the rational 
incompatible epistemic standards described by permissivists satisfy the reliability criterion, or 
they do not.  Taking the first horn of the dilemma means that rational incompatible epistemic 
standards collapse into a unique Condorcetian epistemic standard, which supports the denial of 
11 As I indicated in section 1, the claim that rational epistemic standards are maximally reliable is false in an 
internalist framework. But once again, internalists should minimally accept that rational epistemic standards are 
(counterfactually or actually) reliable.
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the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis. Taking the second horn of the dilemma means that 
permissivists concerning epistemic standards can’t make sense of the reliability criterion, which 
makes such a type of Permissiveness less plausible. Either way, the argument from permissive 
epistemic standards is compromised.
 Consider the first horn of the dilemma. Suppose that rational epistemic standards are 
maximally  reliable.  In  such  a  context,  the  Condorcetian  epistemic  standard  contradicts 
Permissiveness. Even if there are equally reliable but incompatible epistemic standards, we can 
use  such  epistemic  standards  to  design  an  even  more  reliable  epistemic  standard.  The 
conceivability of a Condorcetian epistemic standard confirms that verdict. In other words, if (i) 
rational epistemic standards have something to do with their reliability and (ii) there exists a 
unique  maximally  reliable  epistemic  standard,  this  entails  that  Permissiveness  concerning 
epistemic standards is false.
Here  is  another  way  to  put  it.  Defenders  of  the  Permissive  Epistemic  Standards 
Thesis  think that  there  are  reliable  but  incompatible  epistemic standards.  Such standards  are 
supposed to be equally reliable, and so we can’t make a difference between these standards in 
terms of their reliability. However, this can’t support the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis: 
if there are incompatible but equally reliable epistemic standards, there has to be an even more  
reliable epistemic standard. So, there has to be one maximally reliable epistemic standard, which 
compromises the view that epistemic standards are permissive.
 Let’s  now  turn  to  the  second  horn  of  the  dilemma  by  assuming  that  rational 
epistemic standards are not necessarily maximally reliable. On this assumption, it seems that a 
worry  raised  in  section  1  is  correct:  endorsing  the  Permissive  Epistemic  Standards  Thesis 
amounts  to  separating  epistemic  rationality  and  reliability.  This  is  problematic.  Without 
reliability, it seems that we are left with very minimal constraints on rational epistemic standards, 
such as the internal consistency of rational standards (see n. 11). However, many consistent sets 
of standards do not seem rational. If a body of epistemic standards is rational insofar as it satisfies 
consistency, any skeptic, grue-projector or conspiracy theorist can be regarded as rational (as 
long as his or her epistemic standards are consistent), and there is something wrong with such a 
conclusion (Horowitz 2014, 45).
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Defenders of the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis then face a dilemma. Taking 
the first horn of the dilemma, rational epistemic standards are maximally reliable. However, even 
if  several  epistemic  standards  or  standards  of  reasoning  are  equally  reliable,  there  exists  an 
epistemic  standard  that  is  even  more  reliable,  which  contradicts  the  Permissive  Epistemic 
Standards Thesis. Taking the second horn of the dilemma, rational epistemic standards are not 
maximally reliable. However, under such an assumption, we lack plausible constraints on what 
counts as rational epistemic standards. For instance, if permissive epistemic standards amount to 
consistent epistemic standards, many unreasonable but consistent epistemic standards will count 
as rational. Either way, the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis is compromised.
3.2. An escape route? Epistemic supererogation and the reliability criterion
It could be argued that, while the Condorcetian epistemic standard is more reliable 
than the putative permissive epistemic standards described by Titelbaum and Kopec, this does not 
entail  that  rational  agents are  required to adopt  the Condorcetian standard.  Indeed,  we could 
introduce a distinction between the required and the supererogatory, as in the following:
Epistemic  Supererogation.  While  some  epistemic  standards  are  more  reliable  than  others, 
satisfying them is supererogatory. Agents are praiseworthy for satisfying such standards, but 
they are not  required to.  By way of contrast,  satisfying some epistemic standards that are 
reliable to a certain degree is  required (such as the standards described by Titelbaum and 
Kopec).
Epistemic  Supererogation  ends  up  weakening  the  Reliability  Criterion:  an agent  can  satisfy 
suboptimal epistemic standards while being sufficiently reliable. This strategy has been pursued 
by Li, who claims that we can imagine a “special type of agent who performs special epistemic  
acts—acts that involve levels of insight,  intelligence,  and imagination that even very rational 
agents can fail to achieve. But we aren’t required to exhibit such epistemic virtues” (Li 2017, 2). 
According to him, part  of the debate surrounding Permissiveness has to do with a confusion 
between the supererogatory and the required.
Can we save the Permissive Epistemic  Standards  Thesis  by making a  distinction 
between  the  required  and  the  supererogatory?  Is  the  Condorcetian  epistemic  standard 
supererogatory? There are two reasons why such a possibility is problematic. First, it is hard to 
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think of a good reason why epistemically rational agents can ignore better epistemic standards 
within their grasp. In fact, many philosophers have noted that one’s beliefs that one’s standards 
are suboptimal can entail various forms of problematic incoherence  (Elga 2010). This suggests 
that epistemically rational agents ought to satisfy the optimal epistemic standards available to 
them. Second, even if the separation between the required and the supererogatory is correct, such 
a separation does not affect  ideal theories of epistemic rationality. Perhaps that, in order to be 
rational, agents with limited cognitive capacities are merely required to satisfy some “reliable 
enough” (though not maximally reliable) epistemic standards. Still, the dilemma would hold with 
respect to ideal theories of epistemic rationality,  where epistemically rational agents ought to 
satisfy the optimal epistemic standards.
4. Conclusion
In this  paper,  I  argued against  the Permissive Epistemic Standards Thesis,  which 
roughly states that there are incompatible but equally rational epistemic standards available to 
agents. Using Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, I argued that putative equally reliable but incompatible 
epistemic standards entail the existence of a unique and more reliable epistemic standard.
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